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Abstract 
Many instructional strategies that appear to improve learners’ performance during training, may 
not realize adequate post test performance or transfer to a job. And the converse has been found 
true as well: instructional strategies that appear to slow the learner’s progress during training 
often lead to better post-training or transfer performance. For example, many studies have shown 
beneficial effects of random over blocked practice on transfer of learning, even though blocked 
practice often leads to better performance during the training session. In a 2 x 3 factorial 
experiment (N = 120) with the factors practice schedule (random, blocked) and critical thinking 
prompts (before task, after task, none), this study investigates whether this also applies to 
complex judgement tasks, and whether critical thinking prompts can enhance the effectiveness of 
particular practice schedules. It is hypothesized that prompts provided after task execution yield 
best transfer in a random practice schedule, whereas prompts provided before task execution 
yield best transfer in a blocked schedule. In line with our hypothesis, a blocked schedule led to 
better performance than random practice during training, but not on the transfer test, where a 
random schedule was beneficial. The hypothesized interaction effect was also found: critical 
thinking prompts after task execution significantly benefit transfer performance of participants 
following a random schedule, and transfer performance following a blocked schedule can be a 
little enhanced through providing critical thinking prompts before task execution. These results 
warrant instruction in critical thinking processes to teach complex judgment tasks, using random 
practice schedules combined with critical thinking prompts provided after task execution.  
Keywords: contextual interference; critical thinking; complex judgment; learning; transfer.  
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The Effects of Practice Schedule and Critical Thinking Prompts on Learning and Transfer 
of a Complex Judgment Task 
A major aim of educational and training programs is to foster learning and transfer. 
Learning is understood as the observable and enduring change in knowledge or behaviour as a 
result of experience (Skinner, 1950; Thorndike, 1910). This definition of learning incorporates 
both learning as a process of change and the outcome of that process: the durable change in 
knowledge or behaviour (Alexander, Schallert, & Reynolds, 2009). However, substantial 
changes in performance during training (apparent learning) are not always a good indicator of 
actual learning (Bjork, 1994; Bjork & Bjork, 2006). Post-training performance on test tasks that 
resemble the training tasks, and transfer to new tasks may be better indicators of a durable 
change in behaviour or knowledge. Transfer can be defined both in terms of the ability to 
flexibly apply (parts of) what has been learned to new tasks and/or new situations (see e.g., 
Detterman & Sternberg, 1993; Mayer, & Wittrock, 1996), as well as in terms of preparation for 
future learning (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999). Increasing interference between training tasks by 
sequencing different variations of the task randomly (i.e. contextual interference) may enhance 
post-training performance (Magill & Hall, 1990; Wulf & Shea, 2002). Research has also shown 
that instructional techniques to induce critical thinking (for a review, see Abrami et al., 2008) can 
foster learning and transfer. The present study investigates whether and how these techniques can 
be combined to foster learning and transfer of a complex judgment task. 
Complex Judgment Tasks 
In the numerous choices or judgments people make every day, two distinct classes can be 
identified: Value judgments, which express their preferences, and predictions, which reflect what 
they expect to happen (Hogarth, 1980). Value judgments encompass for example a choice for 
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one house over another, or one pair of shoes over another. Predictions concern future outcomes, 
such as expectations regarding how someone might react to what you say or do, or who will win 
the next presidential elections. In this study we focus on predictive judgment tasks.  
Consider for example an air defence officer who needs to judge the threat of an object, 
such as a hostile airplane. In making this judgment, several so-called ‘points of reference’ need 
to be considered that are expected to be related to estimating the threat of an object, such as its 
speed, position, altitude, direction, and identity. These points of reference are part of the officer’s 
mental representation of the network of relationships between elements (objects, events) in the 
environment and the threat to be predicted. For example: How important is 
speed/identity/position? Is speed more important than identity when an object is near one’s own 
position? What constitutes a higher threat, an object that is fast and far away but moving towards 
one’s own position, or an object that is slow and very close but moving away? Accuracy of the 
judgment is assumed to depend on the extent to which the officer’s mental representation 
matches the real network of relationships (Hogarth, 1980). It is this match, or lack thereof, that is 
the object of study within Social Judgment Theory (SJT; Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Hammond, 
McClelland, & Mumpower, 1980), using policy capturing methods (for an overview see Dhami, 
Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004).  
Within the SJT research paradigm, an experimental method was devised to study how 
people learn such difficult judgment tasks: The (Multiple) Cue Probability Learning experiment 
(MCPL; Björkman, 1965; Brehmer, 1972; Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Brunswik & Herma, 
1951; Hammond, Hursch, & Todd, 1964; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 1964; Smedslund, 
1955), also referred to as Multidimensional Functional Learning (MFL; Hoffman, Earle, & 
Slovic, 1981). During a typical MFL experiment a person makes judgments based on a number 
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of probabilistic cues over a series of trials. Feedback may be given on each trial, or feedback 
may be given after subsets of trials. The aim is to learn to correctly predict the quantitative or 
categorical criterion value on each trial. Learning the relationships between one or more cues and 
the criterion requires that the learner compares different situations, with respect to the cue values 
and the criterion.  
An important training goal for complex judgment tasks is not only learning the 
importance of different cues and their relationships, but also transfer of what has been learned 
into new tasks and future learning situations. Previous research has shown that both increasing 
contextual interference (Helsdingen, Van Gog & Van Merriënboer, 2010) and critical thinking 
instruction (Cohen, Freeman & Thompson, 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996; Helsdingen & Van 
den Bosch, et al., 2010) can enhance learning and transfer of complex judgment to novel tasks. 
We will discuss these techniques in more detail below. 
Contextual Interference 
Research has shown that some interventions that enhance performance during training 
may have detrimental effects on retention and transfer performance, and conversely, instructional 
manipulations that degrade performance during skill acquisition may support the long-term goals 
of training (for an overview, see Schmidt & Bjork, 1992). An example of the latter is by 
providing a practice schedule where different variations of the learning tasks are sequenced 
randomly (e.g., A-B-C-B-C-A-A-C-B) as opposed to sequenced in separate blocks (e.g., AAA-
BBB-CCC) of related tasks (Shea & Morgan, 1979). This type of random sequencing is also 
often referred to as interleaving practice materials, or mixed practice (Hatala, Brooks, & 
Norman, 2003; Richland, Bjork, Finley, & Linn, 2005). The contextual interference effect refers 
to the consistent finding that increasing interference between training tasks by such random 
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practice may degrade performance during training but lead to better post-training performance 
and transfer than after blocked practice (Lee & Simon, 2003; Shea & Morgan, 1979; Wulf & 
Shea, 2002). It has mainly been studied in motor tasks (Brady, 1998; Cross, Schmitt, & Grafton, 
2007; Guadagnoli & Lee, 2004; Lee & Magill, 1983; Magill & Hall, 1990; Shea & Morgan, 
1979; Simon, 2007). However similar findings have been obtained with for example procedural 
tasks (Carlson, 1989; Carlson & Schneider, 1989; Carlson, Sullivan, & Schneider, 1989; Carlson 
& Yaure, 1990), cognitive operational tasks, such as interacting with automatic teller machines 
(Jamieson & Rogers, 2000), language learning (Jacoby, 1978), foreign vocabulary learning 
(Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 1998, 2002), learning logical rules (Schneider, Healy, Ericsson, & 
Bourne, 1995), learning problem solving from worked examples (Paas & Van Merriënboer, 
1994), and troubleshooting tasks (De Croock, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998).  
Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain the contextual interference effect (for 
an overview see e.g. Lee & Simon, 2004; Magill & Hall, 1990). The two most prominent 
explanations are the elaborative-processing hypothesis (Shea & Morgan, 1979) and the 
forgetting-and-reconstruction hypothesis (Lee & Magill, 1983). The elaborative processing 
hypothesis holds that random practice forces the learner into making intertask comparisons (Shea 
& Morgan; Shea & Titzer, 1993; Shea & Zimny, 1983, 1988; Lin, Fisher, Winstein, Wu, & 
Gordon, 2008). The need to identify each task variation that is presented causes the disadvantage 
during learning, whereas in blocked practice, the continued repetition of long series of the same 
task variation makes it less important to keep track of which task is which. Thus, blocked 
practice is less demanding than random practice, and as a consequence, blocked schedules often 
yield better performance during practice than random schedules. However, the need to compare 
and contrast in a random schedule, leading to more elaborate and distinctive memorial 
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representations of the practiced tasks yields superior performance in retention tests. In transfer 
tests, the argument is that random practice has made learners more adept at identifying the 
relevant features of the to-be-performed transfer task, providing an advantage on these novel 
tasks. 
The forgetting–reconstruction hypothesis (Lee and Magill, 1983, 1985) states that random 
practice forces learners to discard the task strategy between tasks and either retrieve or 
reconstruct a new strategy for successive tasks.  In blocked practice, a given strategy can be 
planned and maintained in working memory across an entire block of trials. Although 
modifications may be made to the strategy, this practice schedule generally affords the learner 
only one opportunity to bring up, or construct, each strategy. The uninterrupted repetitions of the 
a similar strategy in blocked practice makes for relatively high-quality performance, but the lack 
of practice at constructing the strategies anew supports relatively poor learning. In random 
practice, the opposite is seen: the need to continually reconstruct the to-be-performed action 
pattern from one trial to the next makes for lower quality performance, but affords an advantage 
in delayed tests of learning, which make high demands on such reconstruction abilities. 
Both the elaborative and the reconstruction processing are assumed to take place in 
working memory during the intertask intervals (Lee & Simon, 2004). A recent study by Lin, 
Fisher, Winstein, Wu, & Gordon, (2008) has shown that when working memory processes are 
disrupted (with transcranial magnetic stimulation) during intertask intervals, the learning benefit 
of random practice disappeared, whereas the learning value of a blocked practice schedule was 
not enhanced by the intertask disruptions. These results underpin the elaborative processing 
hypothesis and fail to support the forgetting-reconstruction hypothesis. 
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Another instructional intervention that may encourage learners to consider more task 
features, compare between tasks and thus enhance learning and transfer test performance is 
critical thinking instruction.  
Critical Thinking Instruction 
Critical thinking is conceptualized as higher order thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, 
and goal directed. It entails the ability to recognize the fallibility of one’s own opinions 
(Nickerson, 1987), to reason from starting points with which one disagrees (Norris & Ennis, 
1989) or to accept statements as true even when they don’t agree with one’ own position 
(Zechmeister & Johnson, 1992). It is involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, 
calculating likelihoods, and making decisions (Frijters, Ten Dam, & Rijlaarsdam, 2008; Halpern, 
2003). Within the critical thinking research community, there is an ongoing debate about the 
issue of generalizability or specificity of critical thinking skills (Kuhn, 1999; Siegel, 1991). 
Some studies have shown that special critical thinking programs do not usually result in long 
lasting effects (Perkins & Salomon, 1989; Singley & Anderson, 1989; Tsui, 1999). But at the 
same time, several authors point out that some general principles of critical thinking transcend 
specific subjects (e.g. Klaczynski, 2001; Stanovich & West, 2000; Tsui, 1999). Transfer of skills 
across different task and knowledge domains is important because today’s jobs require 
professionals to work in continuously changing contexts. Therefore, the challenge is to teach 
critical thinking in the context of specific meaningful subject matter, but in such a way that 
transfer to other domains becomes possible (Brown, 1997; Frijters et al., 2008; Halpern, 1998).  
 There are many different types of critical thinking instruction (see e.g., Abrami et al., 
2008; Facione, 1990), ranging from general approaches in which critical thinking strategies are 
explicitly and domain-independently taught (Ennis, 1989) to very domain specific courses on a 
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specific subject in which the general critical thinking processes are not made explicit (Abrami, et 
al., 2008). The method of critical thinking instruction developed by Cohen and Freeman (1998) 
explicitly teaches general critical thinking skills using domain specific problems. It focuses on 
recognition-based decision making as well as (meta)cognitive techniques that guide and critically 
review this decision-making process (Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996).  
People’s decisions are based on recognition of aspects of a situation, matching recognized 
aspects with earlier experiences (Kuhn, 1999), and forming a mental model of the current 
situation that implies a prototypical or sufficient decision option (Lipshitz & Ben Shaul, 1997). 
However, this mental model will often be incomplete or inconsistent because of missing 
information, conflicting evidence, and unreliable assumptions. Critically testing and evaluating 
one’s mental model are therefore considered paramount in the decision-making process, 
especially when high stakes are involved, when problems are dynamic and complex, or both. 
Judgment based on recognition of a situation requires exposure to many different problems 
during training. Furthermore, training should foster the (meta)cognitive skills that allow decision 
makers to verify and improve the results of recognition-primed decision making processes, by 
identifying evidence-conclusion relationships (i.e., arguments), critiquing the arguments used to 
support a conclusion (i.e., identifying incompleteness, conflict, or unreliability), and correcting 
the errors in argumentation (Cohen et al., 1996). 
The method for critical thinking instruction described below typically involves an 
explanation of the decision making process beforehand and an instructor who prompts the 
learner to reflect on his or her cognitive strategy and initiate one of the critical thinking steps 
during learning. These steps include (Freeman & Cohen, 1996; see also Helsdingen, Van den 
Bosch et al., 2010): 
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Creating a story: A story is a comprehensive assessment of the situation, in which all 
existing evidence is incorporated and explained and assumptions are made about uncertain 
aspects of the situation. Past, present and future are addressed in the story. The purpose of story 
building is to keep participants from assessing situations solely on isolated events. Instead, 
participants are taught how they can integrate the available information into its context.  
Testing a story: Participants are instructed how to identify inconsistency and uncertainty, 
and how to adjust or refine their story by deliberate testing. They have to correct these problems 
by collecting more data, retrieving knowledge from memory, making assumptions about the 
missing piece of the story, or by resolving conflicts in the argumentation.  
Evaluating a story: After a story is constructed and tested for gaps, it should be evaluated 
for its plausibility. The decision maker has to take a step back, identify critical or hidden 
assumptions and play the devil’s advocate by falsifying these assumptions, that is, explaining 
how an assumption can be false and build an alternative story.  
Quick test: Critical thinking is not always appropriate. Decision makers have to evaluate 
the time available and the consequences of their actions. In stressful situations such as those 
often encountered by professional decision makers, there is usually little time to spare. The 
decision makers should act immediately unless the risk of delay is acceptable, the costs of errors 
are high (i.e., when lives are at stake), and/or the situation is non-routine or problematic (i.e., 
complex or novel problems).   
Instructors usually deliver prompts when they think they are required during the training. 
Such (meta)cognitive prompting in itself can be effective for learning: In the educational 
literature, positive effects are mentioned of, for example, planning prompts (Davis, 2003), 
driving questions (Dochy, 1992; Douglas, Hosokawa, & Lawler, 1988; Morgan & Saxton, 1991; 
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Naidu & Bernard, 1992; Orlich, Harder, Callahan, Kauchak, & Gibson, 1994; Rowntree, 1992), 
deep level reasoning questions (Craig, Sullins, Witherspoon, & Gholson, 2006), and reflection 
prompts (e.g., Belland, Glazewski, & Richardson, 2007; Davis & Linn, 2000; Van den Boom, 
Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2007; Van den Boom, Paas, Van Merriënboer & Van Gog, 2004).  
Cohen and colleagues (Cohen et al., 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996) attributed the 
beneficial effects of critical thinking instruction on learning to participants having acquired an 
appropriate decision making strategy. When students are taught critical thinking skills, they are 
less likely to make the typical judgment mistakes that are caused by for example confirmation 
bias or failures to reason adequately about probabilities (Halpern, 1997). Thus, they will show 
better overall performance on judgment and decision-making. However, in a study by 
Helsdingen, Van den Bosch et al., (2010) in which naval warfare officers learn to identify, 
categorize, and react to naval surface threats in a dynamic and probabilistic simulated 
environment, critical thinking instruction was found to have effects primarily on transfer 
performance; the test included real-world events presented in a simulated environment. On this 
transfer test, officers who received critical thinking instruction were better at selecting relevant 
information, identifying missing or conflicting evidence, providing arguments for their 
assessments, planning their actions in time, and displayed better team skills than officers who 
received the same amount of judgment training but without critical thinking instruction. This 
may be an indication that apart from having acquired a better decision making strategy, 
participants also gained a more abstract level of understanding of the task content that enabled 
them to solve decision problems that differed from the learning problems on a superficial and a 
structural level.  
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Critical thinking instruction that includes (meta)cognitive prompts may have beneficial 
effects on learning and transfer because it might facilitate processes such as self explanation and 
reflection, which have been proven to enhance learning and transfer (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; 
Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; 
Ferguson-Hessler & De Jong, 1990; Lee & Hutchinson, 1998; Renkl, 1997). Findings by 
Schworm and Renkl (2007) seem particularly relevant for complex judgment tasks: they 
demonstrated that self-explanation is a promising method of enhancing skills in ill-structured 
domains requiring argumentation. Chi et al. (1989) attributed the positive effects of self-
explanation during training tasks on learning and transfer performance to learners being able to 
judge their learning progress adequately, and thus be able to identify their additional learning 
needs to attain their ultimate learning goal. More recently, Chi (2000) has proposed that self-
explanations may also play an important role in testing and repairing one’s own mental model. 
Although this explanation was based primarily on text comprehension research, it may also play 
a role in the effectiveness of the critical thinking method developed by Cohen et al. (1996). They 
refer to creating, testing, and evaluating a ‘story’, but this ‘story’ reflects a mental model of a 
situation.  
The Present Study 
As mentioned before, previous research has shown that both increasing contextual 
interference (Helsdingen, Van Gog et al., 2010) and critical thinking instruction (Cohen et al., 
1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996; Helsdingen, Van den Bosch et al., 2010) can enhance learning 
and transfer of complex judgment to novel tasks. The present study investigates whether and 
how these instructional techniques can be combined to foster learning and transfer of complex 
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judgment, not only in terms of transfer to novel tasks but also in terms of preparation for future 
learning.  
It does so by examining the effects of random and blocked practice schedule in 
combination with no critical thinking instruction or critical thinking instruction involving either 
proactive prompts (i.e., given before execution of several tasks) or retrospective prompts (i.e., 
given after execution of several tasks) next to a general instruction, using an MFL-task in the 
domain of criminal investigation. Participants’ task is to read a case description and judge its 
priority for the police on the basis of several cues that appear in each case description. 
Participants received feedback about the actual priority after they gave their estimate; thus, by 
comparing the different cue values and priorities of subsequent cases, participants could learn to 
identify the relevant cues and how these related to the priority. In a blocked practice schedule, 
only one cue changed value from one case to the next, thus providing the participants the 
opportunity to see how this particular cue changed the priority of a case.  In a random practice 
schedule, none, one, or several cues changed value from one case to the next, requiring 
participants to focus on all cues with each presentation of a case and compare their values to the 
previous presentation. Hence, participants have to process more information in the random 
practice schedule, and this may result in more elaborate representations of the domain.  
Critical thinking prompts draw participants’ attention to the similarities and differences 
between consecutive cases and how these differences affect the priority. It is hypothesized that in 
order to be effective in combination with different practice schedules, timing of the critical 
thinking prompts is crucial. In a blocked practice schedule, critical thinking processes would 
need to be prompted before execution of the task (i.e., proactive), so that critical thinking may 
induce the intertask elaborative processes that are normally absent in blocked practice (Lin, 
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Fisher, Winstein, Wu, & Gordon, 2008). In a random practice schedule, the key factor in 
successful planning of critical thinking prompts is the learners’ limited processing capacity: 
When learners already enjoy the learning benefit of the intertask elaborative processes that are 
induced by the random schedule, few if any cognitive resources are available for critical thinking 
processes (cf. Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). , However, prompting critical thinking 
after execution of the training task (i.e., retrospective) may have additional beneficial effects on 
learning and transfer without leading to processing capacity problems. 
In sum, it is hypothesized that during learning a blocked practice schedule generates 
better performance than a random practice schedule. Regarding learning outcomes, measured in 
terms of post-test and transfer test performance, it is hypothesized that in the conditions without 
critical thinking instruction and prompts, random practice will be more effective than blocked 
practice. In the conditions with critical thinking instruction and prompts, it is expected that 
learners in a blocked practice schedule profit more from proactive prompts than from 
retrospective or no prompts, while in a random practice schedule, learners benefit more from 
retrospective prompts than from proactive or no prompts. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 120 students from different departments of two large Dutch universities 
(63 males and 57 females). Their age varied from 20 to 25 years (M = 21.58, SD = 1.59). 
Participation was voluntary and rewarded with 45 Euros. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the six conditions in a 2 x 3 factorial design with the factors Practice Schedule (Blocked 
or Random) and Critical-Thinking Prompts (Proactive, Retrospective, or None): (a) blocked 
practice schedule with proactive critical-thinking prompts (n = 20), (b) blocked practice schedule 
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with retrospective critical-thinking prompts (n = 20), (c) blocked practice schedule without 
prompts (n = 19), (d) random practice schedule with proactive critical-thinking prompts (n = 20), 
(e) random practice schedule with retrospective critical-thinking prompts (n = 21), and (f) 
random practice schedule without prompts (n = 20).  
Materials  
Training tasks. A set of 32 case descriptions of crimes was developed for this experiment. 
Each case had to be prioritized on the urgency for the police to deal with it. Priorities could be 
determined on the basis of the dichotomous values on three different cues that occurred in each 
case description: (a) the condition of the victim (injured, dead), (b) the nature of the crime 
(burglary, violence/holdup), and (c) the use of a weapon (no firearm, firearm). The upper part of 
Table 1 presents the priority scores for each combination of cue values. Four crime descriptions 
were developed for each of the eight combinations of cue values, resulting in 32 cases (see 
Figure 1 for an example of a case). Case descriptions, relevant cues, and their effect on priorities 
were evaluated and approved by a police officer on being representative for the domain1.  
The cases were presented one by one on a computer screen (see Figure 1). On the lower 
half of the screen, beneath the presentation of the case, a slide bar with an indicator of priority 
was presented. The slide bar covered the whole range of priority scores: 1-100. There were no 
numbers or other reference points on or near the slide bar. The participants could manipulate an 
indicator on the slide bar with the computer mouse to mark the priority of a case. In addition, 
                                                
1 The relationships between cues and priorities of cases were artificial: The model underlying the 
relationships was constructed specifically for experimental purposes. However, since it was important that the task 
was representative of real-word judgment tasks, the model resembled real-world relationships in content, importance 
and direction of the relationships.  
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they could adjust the margin of the area on the right and the left from the indicator (minimum = 
2, maximum = 50).  
Feedback during training consisted of a second slide bar with the indicator at the position 
of the true priority score. This feedback slide bar was presented above the first one, directly after 
participants indicated their priority and margins. If the true priority score was within the margin 
of the participant’s response, a green rectangle was presented around the feedback slide bar. If 
the true priority score lay outside this margin, a red rectangle was presented around the feedback 
slide bar. 
Practice schedules. In the blocked practice schedule, the order of 32 training tasks was 
the same for all participants. The 32 training tasks were sequenced in such a way that in the first 
12 tasks only one cue changed its value from one task to the next, and the cue that changed its 
value was alternated from task to task. Thus, if the first task involved a dead victim (cue 1) after 
a burglary (cue 2) and the use of a firearm (cue 3), the second task could be a dead victim (cue 1: 
unchanged) after a burglary (cue 2: unchanged) without the use of a firearm (cue 3: changed), 
and the third task could subsequently be an injured victim (cue 1: changed) after a burglary (cue 
2: unchanged) without the use of a firearm (cue 3: unchanged). In the following 12 tasks two 
cues simultaneously changed value from one task to the next. In the last 8 tasks all three cues 
changed value from one case to the next. In the random practice schedule the training tasks were 
presented in a randomized order that was the same for all participants in this schedule. 
Critical-thinking instruction and prompts. Participants in all critical thinking conditions 
were introduced to critical thinking with a paper-based instruction (see appendix A) explaining 
four steps: (a) creating a model of the relationships between the cues and the priorities, (b) 
testing a model, (c) evaluating a model, and (d) finding alternative explanations (i.e., 
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contingencies). Apart from this textual explanation, a handout with a graphic representation of 
the four steps (Figure 2) and two short stories of critical thinking in real-world situations were 
provided.  
Both the 12 proactive and the 12 retrospective prompts were formulated as open-ended 
questions provided on the computer screen, which intended to focus the participant’s attention to 
particular cues and how their priority changed (for examples, see Table 2). The proactive 
prompts preceded every two or three cases, similar retrospective prompts followed those same 
cases, thus, only the timing relative to the training tasks was different for both critical thinking 
conditions. Participants were told that the open-ended questions could help them learn the task 
and they were therefore required to answer the questions for themselves. 
Post-test and transfer test. The post-test consisted of 8 tasks that were similar to the 
training tasks in structural features (same combination of cues and same domain, i.e., crimes) but 
different to the training tasks in surface features (i.e., cover stories). The post-test tasks were 
presented in the same random order to all participants and the sequence contained no critical-
thinking prompts and no feedback.  
The transfer test consisted of 32 tasks describing traffic offenses that differed in both 
structural and surface features from the training tasks (see appendix b or 
http://files.me.com/anne.h/a0thyu). Priorities depended on: (a) nature of the offence (speeding, 
driving without insurance), (b) condition of the offender (drunk, not drunk), and (c) history (first 
offence, recidivist). These transfer tasks were scheduled in random order that was the same for 
all participants and no critical-thinking prompts were given. However, feedback was provided 
because the new domain contained new cues to base the priority on. See the bottom part of Table 
1 for an overview of the cues and priorities of the training, post-test, and transfer tasks. 
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Procedure  
The experiment had a duration of approximately two hours and was run in sessions with 
at most six participants. Before the experiment started, participants read a short instruction 
explaining how to rate the priority of the cases by means of the slide bar and how to indicate the 
margin of certainty. All participants received paper and pencil to make notes. In addition, the 
critical-thinking conditions received a written instruction about the four steps of the critical-
thinking method, the handout with the graphical representation of the four steps of critical 
thinking, and two example stories of critical thinking in real world situations. Then, all 
participants were assigned to a computer and started to work on the training cases of their 
respective condition. The post-test was administered right after completion of the training tasks, 
and the transfer test immediately followed the post-test. Participants could choose their own 
pace; the time they took to complete the whole experiment was logged. For both training tasks 
and test tasks, participants’ deviation score, defined as the absolute difference between the 
estimated priority and the true priority of the case, was automatically stored in a log file. After 
completion of the transfer test open exit interviews were conducted with the participants. 
Results 
For training, post-test and transfer, the mean deviation scores for each phase of 8 
consecutive cases were calculated for each participant. Time-on-task spent on the entire 
experimental session did not differ between conditions, F (1, 114) = .01, p > .20. In all analyses 
reported below, a significance level of .05 is set, and partial eta-squared or Cohen’s d are 
reported as a measure of effect size.  
Training  
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Participants’ deviation scores over all conditions ranged from 11.90 to 31.06 (M = 19.63, 
SD = 3.92). Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the deviation scores per phase 
(of 8 cases) and condition.  A repeated measures ANOVA with Practice Schedule and Critical 
Thinking Prompts as between-subjects factors and Phase (four consecutive phases of 8 tasks) as 
within-subjects factor was conducted to analyze the effects on participants’ deviation scores over 
time during training. There was a substantial main effect of Phase, Λ = .217, F (3, 112) = 
135.046, p < .01, ηp2 =.783, with all groups showing a reduction in deviation scores (i.e., 
performance improvement) across the four phases. There was also a main effect of Practice 
Schedule, F (1, 114) = 14.431, MSE = 52.998, p < 0.01, ηp2  = .112. As predicted, participants in 
the blocked practice schedule had lower deviation scores (better performance) than participants 
in the random practice schedule. There was no main effect of Critical Thinking Prompts, F (2, 
114) = 2,225 ns.  
There was no significant three-way interaction of Phase, Practice Schedule and Critical 
Thinking Prompts, Λ = .919, F (6, 224) = 1.614, ns. There were, however, significant 
interactions between Practice Schedule and Phase, Λ = .847, F (3, 112) = 6.732, p < .01, ηp2 
=.153, and between Critical Thinking Prompts and Phase, Λ = .813, F (6, 224) = 4.060, p < .01, 
ηp2 =.098 , indicating that performance development over time was different for the different 
practice schedules and for the different critical thinking instruction conditions.  Post hoc t-tests 
for the effects of Practice Schedule on performance showed that participants in the blocked 
practice schedule (M = 18.53, SD = 6.42 and M = 16.08, SD = 5.89) outperformed participants in 
the random practice schedule (M = 24.34, SD = 5.71 and M = 18.34, SD = 4.59) only in phases 2  
(t(118)= -5.24, p <.01, d = 0.96) and 3 (t(118) = 2.34, p =.02, d = 0.42). Post-hoc tests for the 
effects of Critical Thinking Prompts on performance per phase (of 8 consecutive cases) showed 
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for the 12 comparisons only one significant difference: in phase 2, participants who received 
retrospective prompts (M= 19.39, SD= 1.03) showed significantly higher performance (p = .04, d 
= 3.54) than participants who did not receive prompts (M = 23.07, SD = 1.10), other conditions 
did not differ from each other (see Table 4).   
There was no significant interaction between Critical Thinking Prompts and Practice 
Schedule, F (2, 114) = 2.643, ns. 
Post-Test 
Participants’ deviation scores over all conditions ranged from 3.79 to 29.29 (M = 14.99, 
SD = 5.58). Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations of the deviation scores on the 
post-test. A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the mean deviation scores showed that Critical Thinking Prompts 
had no main effect on performance on the post-test, F(2, 114) = 2.59, ns. There was a main effect 
of Practice Schedule, F(1, 114) = 4.23, MSE = 120.39, p = .04, ηp2  = .04: Participants that 
followed a random practice schedule reached lower deviation scores (M = 14.04, SD =0.68) on 
the post-test (i.e., better performance) than participants that followed the blocked practice 
schedule (M= 16.04, SD = 0.70). However, there was also a significant interaction between 
Practice Schedule and Critical Thinking Prompts, F(2, 114) = 3.26, MSE = 92.78, p = .04, ηp2 = 
.05. This interaction was explored by analysis of both practice schedules separately. Analysis of 
the random practice schedule showed a significant effect of Critical Thinking Prompts, F(2, 58) 
= 5.98, MSE = 153.70, p < .01, ηp2 = .17, with retrospective prompts (M = 10.97, SD = 5.81) 
yielding significantly better (p <.01 d =1.01 and p = .05, d = 0.74) results than both proactive 
prompts (M = 16.21, SD =4.45 ) and no prompts (M= 14.94, SD = 4.81). In the blocked practice 
schedule, Critical Thinking Prompts had no differential effects on performance, F(2, 56) = .48, 
ns.   
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Transfer Test 
Participants’ deviation scores over all conditions ranged from 7.90 to 34.00 (M = 18.08, 
SD = 6.10). Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations of the deviation scores during the 
four consecutive phases of 8 tasks of the transfer test. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
Practice Schedule and Critical Thinking Prompts as between-subjects factors and Phase (four 
consecutive phases of 8 tasks) as within-subjects factor was conducted to analyze the effects on 
participants’ deviation scores over time during the transfer test. There was a substantial main 
effect of Phase, Λ = .503, F(3,112) = 36.851, p < .01, ηp2 =.497, with all groups showing a 
reduction in deviation scores (i.e., performance improvement) over consecutive phases.  There 
was also a main effect of Practice Schedule, F(1,114) = 38.203, MSE = 102.350, p < 0.01, ηp2  = 
.251. As predicted, participants in the random practice schedule had lower (M = 15.29, SD = 
5.59) deviation scores (i.e., better performance) than participants in the blocked practice schedule 
(M = 20.96, SD = 5.24). There was no significant main effect of Critical Thinking Prompts, F(2, 
114) = 1.839 ns.  
There was a significant interaction between Practice Schedule and Critical Thinking 
Prompts, F(2, 114) = 8.972, MSE = 102.350, p < 0.01, ηp2  = .136. Further investigation of this 
interaction by analyzing random and blocked practice schedules separately, showed that Critical 
Thinking Prompts significantly affected participants’ transfer score, both in a random practice 
schedule, F(2, 58) = 4.13, MSE = 116.73, p = .02, ηp2 = .12, and a blocked practice schedule, F(2, 
56) = 6.94, MSE = 158.18, p < 0.01, ηp2 = .20. In line with our hypothesis, in a random practice 
schedule, retrospective critical thinking prompts  (M= 12.49, SD = 4.95) yielded better scores 
(resp. p = .04, d = 0.78, and p =.04 , d= 0.82) on the transfer test than both proactive prompts (M  
= 16.64, SD = 5.66) and no prompts (M = 16.68, SD = 5.29), whereas in a blocked practice 
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schedule, proactive prompts (M= 17.80, SD = 3.03) lead to better scores (resp. p <.01, d = 1.21, 
and p <.02, d = 0.95) than both retrospective prompts (M = 23.16, SD =  5.48) and no prompts 
(M = 21.98, SD = 5.44). 
Other interactions between Phase, Practice Schedule, and Critical Thinking Prompts, Λ = 
.982, F (6, 224) = .347, ns, Phase and Critical Thinking Prompts, Λ = .959, F (6, 224) = .795, ns, 
or Phase and Practice Schedule, Λ = .986, F (3, 112) = .544, ns, were not significant.  
To investigate whether the effects of Practice Schedule and Critical Thinking are present 
from the beginning of the transfer test, or occur only after a few tasks are executed, we examined 
participants’ performance during the first Phase of the transfer test in more detail. Figure 3 
presents the performance data of participants in the 6 different conditions on the first 8 tasks.  
From Figure 3 it becomes clear that all participants start off performing at approximately the 
same level, and the effects of Practice Schedule and Critical Thinking Instruction appear after 2 
tasks. Figure 3 and the pairwise comparisons between the 6 groups (Table 7) clearly show 3 
subgroups in the performance development in that first phase: The blocked practice group 
without prompts and with retrospective prompts are slowest in their performance development, 
the random practice with retrospective prompts learned the new traffic cases quickest, and the 
groups with random practice without prompts, or with proactive prompts are between the slowest 
and quickest developing groups.  
Discussion 
This study examined the effects of critical thinking instruction involving proactive and 
retrospective critical thinking prompts provided in combination with random and blocked 
practice schedules on learning a multidimensional functional training task. With respect to 
participants’ performance it was hypothesized that: (a) A blocked practice schedule yields better 
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performance during training than a random practice schedule and (b) a random practice schedule 
results in best post-test and transfer performance in conditions where no critical thinking 
instruction is provided. However, when such instruction is provided, it was hypothesized that (c) 
blocked practice schedule yields higher transfer when participants receive proactive critical 
thinking prompts rather than retrospective or no prompts, but (d) a random practice schedule 
yields higher transfer when participants receive retrospective prompts rather than proactive or no 
prompts.  
In line with our first hypothesis, results showed that in training, participants who 
followed a blocked practice schedule performed better than participants who practiced according 
to a random schedule. This is consistent with research findings on the effects of contextual 
interference in other domains such as motor skills (Brady, 1998; Magill & Hall, 1990), 
troubleshooting skills (De Croock, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998; Jelsma, Van Merriënboer, & 
Bijlstra, 1988), or language skills (Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 2002). There was an interaction 
between Phase (i.e. the consecutive phases of 8 cases each) and Practice Schedule, subsequent 
post-hoc tests showed that the difference in performance between blocked and random practice 
schedule was not present at the start of training: this indicates that the groups started off at the 
same baseline performance. And at the end of training, again no difference was found between 
performance of participants in the blocked and random practice schedules. This can be explained 
by the fact that the last training tasks in the blocked schedule were scheduled in such a way that 
all cues changed value from one task to the next. Apparently, learners in this blocked group were 
not very adequate in dealing with these changes.  
Looking at results on the post-test and transfer test, we see that participants who followed 
a random practice schedule showed better performance. This is in line with our second 
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hypothesis. This means that the random practice schedule not only prepared participants for the 
random schedule of the post-test tasks, but also improved their ‘future learning’ on the traffic 
cases of the transfer test. Evidently, participants who had followed a random practice schedule 
are able to identify relevant cues and estimate their impact on the priority of a case quicker on a 
subsequent transfer task than participants that had followed a blocked schedule. When we 
examined the first 8 transfer tasks in a little more detail, we found that there was not a first trial 
difference between the practice schedule conditions, but differences in performance became 
evident after two tasks. This makes sense, because to be able to identify relevant cues from the 
irrelevant ones in the case descriptions requires at least a few presentations to see which cues 
recur in the next cases. We assume that participants from the blocked practice group were not 
adequately trained in how to approach the new cases because their practice schedule did not 
require them to consider many cues at the same time and compare their values between 
subsequent tasks, thus leading to less elaborate mental representations of how to approach cue-
criterion tasks. Random practice, on the other hand, forced participants to search for (in-) 
consistencies between subsequent tasks and relating that to the criterion. This provided them 
with more sophisticated schema on cue-criterion tasks and how to approach them.  
 The results on the post- and transfer test also showed that participants in the random 
practice schedule benefited from retrospective critical thinking prompts, but not from proactive 
prompts. It seems that when participants experienced a high load from the random practice 
schedule, they were not able to concurrently apply the critical thinking steps. In fact, the results 
show no difference between the no prompts and the proactive prompts condition for a random 
schedule, which indicates in the random practice, participants were able to completely ignore the 
proactive prompts. This reflects other research findings (e.g., De Bruin, Rikers & Schmidt, 2005; 
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Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007; Winne,1995), showing that specific 
learning strategies and processes such as self-monitoring and self-regulation will only benefit 
learning when learners have considerable resources available for such metacognitive activities. 
Similarly, critical thinking can only be practiced in training situations where participants have 
sufficient resources available. This may partly explain why the results did not show a main effect 
of Critical Thinking Prompts: When participants were overwhelmed by task demands, they 
ignored prompts that provided additional load, thereby creating a situation similar to the No 
Prompts condition. Blocked practice, on the other hand, was easy, and, as Schnotz and 
Kürschner, (2007) concluded, for such easy tasks there is no need for “search for patterns in the 
learning material, restructuring of problem representations, or metacognitive processes”. Thus, as 
becomes apparent from our the transfer test results, unless specifically prompted to engage in 
critical thinking before the execution of a task (proactively), participants were reluctant or unable 
to do so after task execution (retrospectively) causing the Retrospective Prompts condition to 
resemble the No Prompts condition.  
However, contrary to performance on the transfer test, post-test performance was not 
affected by critical thinking prompts. The explanation for this finding probably lies in the nature 
of the post-test tasks. Because these tasks did not differ from the training tasks on structural 
features, participants in all blocked conditions could rely on their specific memories of similar 
cases they had experienced during training. Summarizing, Critical Thinking Prompts mainly 
benefit transfer performance when these prompts are appropriately timed in a specific practice 
schedule, such that overload is avoided in demanding task schedules and active engagement in 
critical thinking is pushed in easy task schedules.  
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A limitation of this study is that we have only an overall time-on-task measure, so it is 
possible that there may have been differences in the amount of time needed to learn the transfer 
test cases between conditions. In that case, however, these time differences must have been 
compensated by differences in the opposite direction in the tests because there were no 
significant differences in overall time-on-task. 
The finding that relative novices were able to profit from the critical thinking instruction 
and prompts while learning a complex judgment task, even in a random practice schedule which 
already increases cognitive load (Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994), is remarkable.  Interestingly, 
their performance was not negatively affected from proactive prompts during a random schedule, 
which suggests that in high workload conditions learners may be able to ignore given prompts all 
together and focus on learning the specific rules and principles of the task without being 
distracted. However, this is speculation, and a limitation of this study is that the responses to 
critical thinking prompts were not recorded either by having participants respond to the prompts 
in writing (cf. Schworm & Renkl, 2007) or by means of verbal protocols (cf. Ericson & Simon, 
1993; Van Gog, Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Witte, 2005). Such data might have provided more 
direct evidence for our assumptions as to why retrospective prompting is effective with random 
practice and proactive prompting is effective with blocked practice. 
Within the critical thinking research community there is ongoing discussion about 
whether explicit instruction is required to enhance critical thinking skills or whether mere 
immersion is effective (see e.g., Abrami et al., 2008), and on whether this skill should be taught 
in a domain-general way or within a specific task or domain (see also e.g., Gagné, 1984). The 
results of our study provide support for the benefit of explicit instruction within a specific task or 
domain. This is in line with results of a recent study by Angeli & Valanides (2008). In their 
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study, Angelis an Valanides compared a 1) general content free method with 2) an approach in 
which critical thinking methods were taught within domain specific problems, 3) a method in 
which domain specific problems were given without explicit teaching of critical thinking 
strategies and 4) a control group. Their results showed superior performance of deliberate 
instruction targeting the teaching of critical-thinking skills embedded within a domain specific 
problem. Teaching of critical thinking skills in a de-contextualized way and with no support or 
feedback from the researcher, did not seem to result in improvement of learner’s critical thinking 
skills (Angeli & Valanides, 2008).   
The results of our study suggest that explicit instruction in critical thinking is effective, 
even without feedback on the critical thinking strategies of learners and without the social 
context, e.g. group discussion or dialogue between learners and an instructor, as is part of the 
collaborative reasoning approach to critical thinking of Clark et al. (2003). However, based on 
this study we cannot disentangle whether the critical thinking skills themselves transferred, or 
whether critical thinking instruction lead to deeper, more principled understanding of the how to 
approach the type of cue- criterion problems, that is, how to identify which cues are relevant and 
how to compare between cases in order to assess the relative weight of cues.    
Nonetheless, the findings reported here are highly relevant for educational and training 
settings. Training programs for professional decision makers, such as for example military 
commanders, involve scenario based exercises that are preceded by theory classes in which the 
rules of the domain are explained (Knutzon, Walter, Sannier, & Oliver, 2004). The scenario-
based exercises are field or simulator exercises in which learners receive a role and assignment, 
and problems are introduced by events that occur during the course of the scenario. The 
preceding theory classes only tackle the simple or unambiguous rules (e.g. the Rules of 
28 
 
Engagement, military doctrine, or simple if-then rules); whereas in the theatre of war, the 
complexities arise from the interdependencies between these rules and from many more complex 
and ambiguous rules that are not explicitly taught but rather have to be learnt by practice with 
many different scenario based exercises (Drillings & Serfaty, 1997). Therefore, our study has 
taken the scenario-based exercise as a point of reference. The interventions, studied here, 
however, may also have beneficial effects with other types of instruction that involve a higher 
degree of guidance than our learning by doing approach, such as worked examples. As Paas and 
Van Merrienboer (1994) have demonstrated, instruction with worked examples can be enhanced 
by introducing variability of practice. Also, prompting self-explanations has been shown to 
benefit instruction from worked examples (Schworm & Renkl, 2007), but these interventions 
have not been studied in combination. An interesting question for future research would be 
whether the effects of combining contextual interference and critical thinking would be similar in 
a replication of the present study with worked examples, because these are known to lower 
cognitive load compared to problem-solving (Paas, 1992; Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 
2006) and therefore, outcomes regarding for example the combination of random practice and 
proactive prompts might differ.  
However, in considering the practical implications of our results, we have to take into 
account our operationalization of a blocked practice schedule, which is somewhat different from 
blocked schedules as they are traditionally designed in contextual interference studies. In a 
blocked schedule, the sequence of training tasks is such that only one task variation per phase (in 
our study 8 cases) is practiced (e.g. block 1: AAAAAA, block 2: BBBBB, where A and B are 
variations of the training task). As we stated in the Introduction, in complex judgment, the task 
for the judge is to predict a future outcome on the basis of a few cues. In learning to predict such 
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future outcomes, the judge has to learn which cues are relevant (learn cue selection), how each 
cue relates to the criterion to be predicted, and whether cues are intercorrelated (i.e., learn cue-
criterion functions). Thus, the creation of blocks for these complex judgment tasks is less 
straightforward than it would be for less complex tasks. The blocked schedules in our 
experiments, were such that in the first phases one cue changed value from one task to the next. 
In terms of predicting the future outcomes, this would not seem to be a blocked sequence as the 
resulting sequential tasks are different task variations. However, in terms of the training task, that 
is, to learn cue-criterion functions, participants are provided the opportunity to learn the effects 
of one cue-criterion function before moving on to the next. And in the last phase, two (or more) 
cues changed value from one case to the next, providing the opportunity to learn the interaction 
between the cues. The blocked schedule may encourage participants from the start to adopt a 
strategy to focus on the cue that has changed with each new case. Whereas after being trained 
with a random schedule, participants are looking for all the differences between the former cases 
and the current case.  
Although our operationalization of blocked practice differs from other designs in 
contextual interference studies, it does resemble real world training approaches for complex 
judgment and decision-making. For example, sonar image operators, in their training to identify 
and judge sonar contacts, first learn how a sonar image depends on ocean bottom patterns (learn 
specific cue-criterion relationships), then how water temperatures influence sonar image (another 
cue-criterion relationship), and only after that, how ocean bottom pattern and water temperatures 
interact and how that influences the sonar image (see e.g. www.mosaichydro.com). Another 
example involves training of Air Traffic Controllers: first they learn how to separate aircraft on 
the basis of heading only (i.e. not dealing with altitude, or speed), then they practice separating 
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aircraft on the basis of altitude and incorporate that with heading in their practice, after that the 
learn about airspeed, groundspeed, and how that relates to separating aircraft and lastly they 
practice separating aircraft on the basis of all aforementioned attributes (Oprins, 2008). The data 
presented here, however, show that despite the beneficial effects of proactive prompts in blocked 
schedules, such training programs would be well-advised to present the trainee with a random 
sequence of cases, leaving it to the trainee to identify and categorize cues and cue-criterion 
relationships. 
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Appendix A: Instruction to participants, translated (original in Dutch) 
If we want to prepare professionals for the complexities of operational decision making, 
than training should aim to (a) expand and elaborate relevant knowledge of the domain, and (b) 
practice in situation assessment and judgment in complex situations. In order to acquire domain 
knowledge, it is important that a decision maker is presented with adequate practice scenarios. 
 However, to effectively expand and deepen the domain knowledge, it is not enough to just 
practice those scenarios. The learning is enhanced when the various cases are being studied from 
different perspectives and when the consequences of various options are thoroughly evaluated. 
The accumulation of domain knowledge requires a long period of intensive, focussed and 
reflective practice. That principle holds true for most if not all professions. One doesn’t become 
a grandmaster by merely playing many games of chess – it requires focussed study of positions 
and other people’s matches. Neither can one become a renowned piano player by just playing 
many sonatas; it requires intensive practise of piano techniques and study of musical invariants. 
The same principle applies to many professional decision-making, e.g. military command and 
control: one doesn’t become an expert by merely running a lot of scenarios – what one learns 
depends on the profundity of the practice exercises. We have developed a training method that is 
based on the way expert decision-makers work in complex situations and that stimulates an 
active, focussed and reflective study of training scenarios. That method is called “Critical 
Thinking”. 
In the Critical Thinking Training the emphasis is on the application of expert strategies. 
What are the strategies of an expert and in what way do they differ from those of non-experts? If 
less experienced decision makers are confronted with an unknown or complex situation, they 
often base their assessment of the situation on only a few cues. Often they do not recognize how 
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the various cues are or could be related en they are therefore often inclined to come to 
conclusions through isolated cues. When experienced decision makers are confronted with an 
unknown or complex situation, they use their domain knowledge to get to a first impression of 
the problem. As a next step they continue to actively search for additional information to help 
them complement, refine or reassess their initial view. They also try to verify whether their 
assumptions are and look for coherency in the available data. 
In short, experts are often capable to act at two different levels at the same time. Of 
course they act at the task execution level, but on top they also manage to observe their own 
approach to the task, to guard it and to guide it.  That allows them to look beyond the superficial 
characteristics of the situation they are in. Through reflection on the situation and their own way 
of handling it, they achieve a better understanding of the situation and risks involved. Their 
actions therefore, often yield better results. The approach by experts is the model for our Critical 
Thinking Training.  
Our training is focussed on training trainees to acquire an approach that experts have 
learned through experience. An obvious challenge we had to overcome is that experts do not 
have a separate work instruction on how to become experts, but that getting experience is an 
integral part of ‘doing the job’. To transfer the expert approach to non-experts, we have designed 
the Critical Thinking Methodology. This method consists of four distinctive steps:  
Creating a story: A story is a comprehensive assessment of the situation, in which all 
existing evidence is incorporated and explained and assumptions are made about uncertain 
aspects of the situation. Past, present and future are addressed in the story. The purpose of story 
building is to keep participants from assessing situations solely on isolated events. Instead, 
participants are taught how they can integrate the available information into its context.  
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Testing a story: Participants are instructed how to identify inconsistency and uncertainty, 
and how to adjust or refine their story by deliberate testing. They have to correct these problems 
by collecting more data, retrieving knowledge from memory, making assumptions about the 
missing piece of the story, or by resolving conflicts in the argumentation.  
Evaluating a story: After a story is constructed and tested for gaps, it should be evaluated 
for its plausibility. The decision maker has to take a step back, identify critical or hidden 
assumptions and play the devil’s advocate by falsifying these assumptions, that is, explaining 
how an assumption can be false and build an alternative story.  
Quick test: Critical thinking is not always appropriate. Decision makers have to evaluate 
the time available and the consequences of their actions. In stressful situations such as those 
often encountered by professional decision makers, there is usually little time to spare. The 
decision makers should act immediately unless the risk of delay is acceptable, the costs of errors 
are high (i.e., when lives are at stake), and/or the situation is non-routine or problematic (i.e., 
complex or novel problems).   
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Appendix b: Case description transfer task (translated from Dutch) 2 
Seventeen-year old Kai Overduin takes his father’s red BMW to drive to his friend 
Gerard’s house. Kai and Gerard then drive to town, park the car close to a bar and sit outside on 
the sidewalk terrace. Kai starts of drinking sodas, like he always does when he ‘borrows’ his 
father’s car, but after three Pepsi’s, he orders a beer. Just one. And after a while another one, and 
just before they go just one more. Around six o’clock the two boys drive back to Kai’s place 
because his father can come home any minute now, and the car has to back at the house before 
that. Kai feels a little weird driving after three beers, because he is not used to drink and drive, so 
he’s careful not to drive too fast. 
                                                
2 Other case descriptions can be found at http:/files.me.com/anne.h/a0thyn 
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Table 1 
Schematic Overview of the Cues, Cue Values and Subsequent Priorities  
Training and post-testcases (crimes) 
Condition of victim Weapon Nature of crime Priority 
Burglary 62 Firearm 
Violence 91 
Burglary 58 
Dead 
No firearm 
Violence 72 
Burglary 29 Firearm 
Violence 43 
Burglary 10 
Injured 
No firearm 
Violence 39 
Transfer cases (traffic offenses) 
Nature of the offense Condition of Offender History Priority 
First offence 84 Drunk 
Recidivist 94 
First offence 64 
Speeding 
Not drunk 
Recidivist 74 
First offence 32 Drunk 
Recidivist 40 
First offence 12 
Driving without 
insurance 
Not drunk 
Recidivist 20 
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Table 2 
Critical Thinking Prompts  
Proactive prompts Reflective prompts 
Are there any similarities between the 
following two cases? What are they? And 
what is different between these cases? 
Were there any similarities between the last 
two cases? What were they? And what were 
the differences?  
The following two cases will differ from the 
former two cases on one specific aspect. Can 
you tell me what that is? And does it have an 
effect on the priority of a case?  
The last two cases were different from the two 
preceding cases on one specific aspect. Can 
you tell me what that was? And did it have an 
effect on the priority of a case? 
Do you consider some aspects to be more 
important than others when estimating a case’s 
priority? 
Do you consider some aspects to be more 
important than others when estimating a case’s 
priority?  
 
